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TRADE REGULATION AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
By JEROME F. LEAVELL*
and
HOWARD L. MILLARD* *
Many businesses, small and large, have felt the lash of the federal anti-
trust statutes. These businesses have paid for restraining trade in inter-
state commerce. But when one surveys professional sports, he sees a policy
of non-enforcement on a wide scale. There is no doubt that professional
sports is also "big business." Most people in America know something
about their favorite team, their favorite player, and the inimical Howard
Cosell. Millions of dollars of revenue have come into the cities which house
professional sports. "It has been estimated that the Giants baseball club
generated more than $325 million in commerce in one year in San Fran-
cisco."' Very clearly, there are numerous unfair trade practices which
occur in professional sports and equally obvious is the fact that there is a
public policy of non-enforcement of antitrust laws applicable to the viola-
tions. This policy is regrettable since, as a commercial enterprise, the
activities of the leagues should also be measured against the antitrust
laws.'
This article will survey the various unfair trade practices which occur
in professional sporting activity. Particular attention will be paid to base-
ball, football, basketball, and hockey, with occasional references to other
professional sports. Both sides of the issue will be examined with references
to significant antitrust decisions which concern the practice under exami-
nation. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn and suggestions made
concerning viable alternatives to the present practices and possible future
developments as to "trade regulation" and professional sports.
I. GENERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
The main impetus for the federal antitrust laws, expressed by the Sher-
man Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, is a
national desire for free enterprise and unrestrained competition. "Strict
interpretation of the Sherman Act dictates that, with the exception of
vertical agreements fixing the price of fair-traded items, all agreements in
restraint of trade are illegal."' 3 However there are two criteria upon which
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. University of Mississippi (A.B., J.D., 1951); Yale University (LL.M., 1965; S.J.D.,
1972).
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1. Comment, Antitrust and Professional Sport: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the
Game?, 22 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 403, n.3 (1973).
2. Id. at 403.
3. Id. at 404.
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the courts judge restraints of trade. The first is called the "rule of reason"
test and was first expounded by the Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.' There the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act prohibited only
unreasonable restraints of trade and that all factors concerning the indus-
try would be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the
restraint. The second criterion upon which courts base their judgement is
called the "per se" rule. In numerous cases the Supreme Court has de-
clared that certain arrangements are so contrary to public policy that they
are classified as per se illegal, i.e., illegal simply because the arrangement
embarked upon and attributed to the defendant exists. In such cases there
is no standard of reasonableness employed by the courts. Some arrange-
ments considered illegal per se are price fixing,5 group boycotts and con-
certed refusals to deal.7 In this spirit, "the reach of the federal antitrust
laws has been interpreted to extend across the entire spectrum of market
activities."8 Obviously the truth of the above statement is questionable
when one surveys the history of trade regulation and professional sports.
II. LEAGUE STRUCTURE
One of the main defenses to alleged antitrust violations which is often
raised by apologists for professional sports is that the league structure
simply does not lend itself to antitrust regulation. It is argued that this
structure is a "special problem" for the antitrust laws.
Application of this policy to professional sports, however, presents special
difficulties because, while the teams are in some respects normal individ-
ual economic units seeking to sell a service to the public, economic compe-
tition between teams is clearly not acceptable as the sole determinant of
their behavior. Professional sports leagues present a unique form of eco-
nomic organization, whose members must compete fiercely in some re-
spects and cooperate in others.'
It would appear, then, that there exists in professional sports a co-
operative spirit between competitors caused by the nature of the industry.
Thus the advocates of a lax antitrust policy toward professional sports
raise an argument similar to the "reasonable restraint" justification held
by the Supreme Court in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United
States.10
4. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
5. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
6. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
7. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
8. Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REv. 737 (1971).
9. Comment, Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Anti.
trust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418, 419 (1967).
10. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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Speaking of the restrictive rules found in professional sports, the advo-
cates of the lax policy state that
rules of this type are essential to a league structure, and although this
cooperation involves a certain deviation from the ideal of free competition,
it is justified because it makes possible a product which unlimited compe-
tition could not produce."
In other words, the otherwise unlawful restraints are necessary in order to
continue the existence of the league structure, and if the league structure
collapses the industry collapses. Arguably, the existence of these re-
straints, even though illegal per se, are better than the collapse of an entire
industry. However, there have been many alternatives suggested to the
restraints now used which will not interfere with the league structure. Thus
far, however, none of these alternatives has been accepted either by the
various professional leagues or by the courts.
Ill. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
At this point some of the unfair trade practices found in professional
sports will be discussed. Each practice will be discussed generally. Then
application of those practices to the professional sports of baseball, foot-
ball, basketball, and hockey will be analyzed with reference to court deci-
sions concerning the individual sports and also toward general antitrust
policy. At the conclusion of each discussion of a particular unfair trade
practice a summary of the main points will be given in order to more
concisely illustrate the beneficial or injurious effect of such practice upon
sports and its relationship to general antitrust policy.
A. Reserve Systems
The reserve systems in professional sports are the most publicized and
restrictive of the restraints imposed by professional sports leagues. "All
sports leagues exercise rigid control over the industry's labor market by
reserve or option clauses in standardized player contracts and by the
player draft."' 2 The most common justification for the existence of the
reserve systems is that the arrangements are necessary to preserve compe-
tition and thus maintain a balance among the league teams which will, in
turn, make the industry profitable.
The reserve system in baseball is commonly called the "Reserve Clause"
and is the most publicized and litigated practice in professional sports. As
a result of the publicity surrounding baseball star Curt Flood's suit against
organized baseball'" many sports fans are now somewhat knowledgable
11. Comment, supra note 1, at 405.
12. Comment, supra note 9, at 420.
13. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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about the reserve system in baseball. Basically defined, baseball's reserve
system is a
system composed of a series of clauses in the standard player contract
providing that a club may renew the player's contract for the ensuing
season, that those players whose contracts have been renewed may not
play for any other club and that a club may not negotiate with a player
who has a contract with another club.14
Baseball's reserve system may be best understood in the light of its
origin and history. It must be remembered, that "in the early years of
federal antitrust law, the athletics industry was in its neophyte stage and
consequently did not warrant the close governmental scrutiny and regula-
tion directed against the more highly developed industries. '"'5 In the late
19th century organized baseball was under threat of financial ruin because
of a lack of competition between the teams. This situation had come about
because too much money was in the hands of just a few teams which were
thereby able to purchase the best players. The owners of the several teams
decided upon the reserve system in order to insure greater competition.
The reserve system as it was then adopted has been used since that time
with few, if any, modifications.
The reserve system in baseball has been challenged unsuccessfully sev-
eral times over the years for violations of the federal antitrust laws. Al-
though the decisions were based upon baseball's exemption from the anti-
trust laws, there can be little doubt that the reserve system in baseball is
an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act." Under the reserve
system in baseball
[a]ll players must sign a Uniform Player Contract which provides inter
alia that if a player does not sign a contract by the first of March with
the club that he played for during the previous season, the club may
unilaterally renew his contract and cut his salary no more than 20%. Any
renewal contract will contain another renewal provision, thus binding the
player perpetually. If the club so desires it may assign the plzyer's con-
tract to any of the other clubs. The teams have also agreed that no club
may negotiate with a player reserved by another club. Finally any player
who fails to report to his club is placed on a Restricted List, and if he
violates his contract of "Reservation" he is placed on the Disqualified
List."
Thus players have three alternatives: (1) play for the team that holds their
contract; (2) quit baseball; or (3) try to obtain an unconditional release
from the teams which holds their contract, thereby gaining the right to
14. Comment, supra note 1, at 407.
15. Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of
an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859 (1971).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970).
17. Comment, supra note 1, at 408 n.30.
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negotiate with the clubs of their choice. The third alternative is quite
difficult to obtain for players of average caliber or above.
Acting only for itself, a team's refusal to deal pursuant to the reserve
system does not violate the antitrust laws. In United States v. Colgate &
Co. the Supreme Court stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer en-
gaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own indepen-
dent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.18
This broad principle was narrowed somewhat in United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co. 11 There it was determined that if a business attempted in any
way to force acceptance of its policy, it would violate the antitrust laws.
Coercion became the key to the legality of a refusal to deal.
The teams in baseball, however, are not acting as independent units, but
together in a league structure. As such, the actions of the teams constitute
a group boycott. The group boycott has been held to be per se illegal under
the antitrust laws. As stated by the Supreme Court in Kor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstan-
ces, nor by a failure to show that they "fixed or regulated prices, parcelled
out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality.""0
As it is currently constituted, the reserve system in baseball represents a
group boycott, or a concerted refusal to deal, and except for the antitrust
exemption, is illegal per se.
Professional football has a variation of the reserve system called the
option clause. At first glance the option clause appears more liberal than
baseball's reserve system but the appearance is deceiving. Without a doubt
the reason for this seemingly more liberal plan is the result of Radovich v.
National Football League,"' in which the Supreme Court held that only
baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws. The option clause in football
allows a club to renew a player's contract unilaterally for one year at a
reduction in salary of not more than 10%. The player may either play that
year or sit it out, but in any event he is bound to the original club for one
year beyond his contract year. At the end of the year he is denominated a
"free agent" and is theoretically able to negotiate his own deal with any
club.2
18. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
19. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
20. 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
21. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
22. Comment, supra note 1, at 412.
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Prior to 1963 the option clause appeared reasonable because it could only
bind a player for one year beyond the expiration of his contract year while
baseball's reserve system could bind a player perpetually to his team. In
an early test case, Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris, the court stated
that the option clause was not "so unreasonable and harsh as to be unen-
forceable in equity.""
In 1963, however, a provision was added to the option clause which in
effect made the option clause as restrictive as baseball's reserve clause. It
has become known as the Rozelle Rule, after the Commissioner of football.
Under this provision after a player plays out his option and negotiates a
contract with another club,
[t]he Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one
or more players from the Active, Reserve or Selection List (including
future selection choices) of the acquiring club as Commissioner, in his sole
discretion, deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the Commis-
sioner shall be final and conclusive.2 4
The effect of this provision is to restrain the bargaining opportunities
which the free agent supposedly possesses. It follows logically that only
players of above average skills would still benefit from the option clause
because no other teams would take the chance of giving up one or more
highly skilled players for a mediocre player.
Because of the "fixed trade" aspects of the option clause it also consti-
tutes a group boycott and a concerted refusal to deal. In Paramount Fa-
mous Lasky Corp. v. United States5 a refusal by the motion picture indus-
try to deal other than under a standard form contract was held violative
of the Sherman Act as being an unreasonable restraint of trade. The group
boycott is of a secondary and not primary nature.
The situation with professional football would most likely be termed a
secondary boycott, the perpetration of an injury through pressure on a
third party to prevent the person from doing business with the one being
pressured. The secondary boycott which is found in professional football
is one motivated by fear.2"
Of course, that fear is of the Rozelle Rule.
Thus, it can be seen that football's option clause, although appearing
less restrictive than baseball's reserve clause, nevertheless leads to the
same violations as its counterpart in baseball, a group boycott and a con-
certed refusal to deal.
23. 348 S.W.2d 37, 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
24. NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. XII, §3 (as amended Jan. 29, 1963).
25. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
26. Comment, The Sherman Act: Football's Player Controls-Are They Reasonable?, 6
CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 133, 142 (1969).
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Basketball, which has been held non-exempt from the antitrust laws, 7
also employs the option clause. It is similar in application to football's
option clause. The effect of the basketball option clause is somewhat mini-
mized by the fact that there are two independent competing leagues in
basketball. The proposed merger of the professional basketball leagues has
been blocked both in the courts and in Congress because of possible anti-
trust problems. Players are thus free to "jump" leagues without the threat
of a secondary boycott or concerted refusal to deal because the two inde-
pendent leagues have not been mergered into one league which could en-
force the option clause. However, among the teams in each league, the
basketball option clause has the same restrictive effect as in football, creat-
ing a per se illegal group boycott and concerted refusal to deal.
Hockey employs a reserve system known as the "Reserve Clause." It is
similar to the system adopted by professional baseball. Like football and
basketball, hockey has been held not to be exempt from the antitrust laws 8
As a result several test cases attacking the reserve system in hockey have
reached conclusions contrary to holdings in similarly constituted factual
situations involving.baseball. Also, as in basketball, there are two separate
and independent hockey leagues and when the well established National
Hockey League tried to use the reserve system to keep their superstars
from "jumping" to the rival league, the reserve system was defeated.
Insofar as the aforementioned reserve clause operates to exclude the WHA
and its member teams from entering the field of major league professional
hockey through the player restraints, it is a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. At this preliminary injunction stage, the Court does not
decide whether the NHL's agreements constitute per se violations of the
Sherman Act.21
It can be seen that hockey, not unlike basketball, is guilty of using an
illegal restraint on trade-the reserve system known as the "Reserve
Clause." This restraint, again, as in baseball, is considered a group boycott
or a concerted refusal to deal and is illegal per se. Perhaps, because of the
non-exempt status of hockey under the antitrust laws, courts will follow
the lead of the aforementioned decision and strike down the reserve system
in hockey in the same manner that per se illegality has been treated in
other industries.
In summarizing the material covering the reserve systems, it must first
be noted that each of the major sports in America has attempted to prac-
tice a form of group boycott and has engaged in a concerted refusal to deal.
Both the group boycott and concerted refusal to deal have been found
violative of the antitrust laws. Sidestepping baseball's exempt status from
27. Robertson v. National Baksetball Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. 73,282 (S.D.N.Y.).
28. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972).
29. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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the antitrust laws, there is no logical reason why the courts should permit
these practices to continue. Professional sports should not be treated dif-
ferently from other high profit industries.
It is the duty of those engaged in alleged violations of the antitrust laws
to conform their actions to the requirements of those laws. It is not the
duty of the courts to conform the antitrust laws to fit a restrictive system
of commerce. 0
B. Player Drafts And Eligibility Rules
The player draft has augmented the restrictive effect of the reserve and
option clauses used by professional sports organizations. The player draft
is applied in essentially the same way in baseball, football, basketball, and
hockey. Teams are given a select number of players to be chosen from
graduating high school or college seniors, each team choosing an equal
number of players. Teams select in reverse order of their league standings.',
The antitrust implications of such policies are many. The present draft
system allows only one team in the league the right to negotiate with the
drafted player. This result is alleviated somewhat in basketball and hockey
where there are two independent leagues and thus a drafted player has the
right to negotiate with two teams. However, regardless of whether the
drafted player has the right to negotiate with one or two teams, the draft
forecloses a substantial portion of the available market to the player. The
Supreme Court has stated that such arrangements in other industries are
per se violations of the antitrust laws. It is a foregone conclusion that, to a
certain degree, each professional sports league has monopoly power. Ad-
dressing itself to this issue in United States v. Griffith, the Supreme Court
declared: "The use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to fore-
close competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a compet-
itor, is unlawful. 3 Additionally, the drafted player faces a concerted re-
fusal to deal because the other teams will not negotiate with him unless
he deals in the manner prescribed by the league. The player draft is an
arrangement by which the competitive parts of the league (the individual
teams) agree not to compete in the available market of new players. A
similar marketing arrangement was held illegal per se by the Supreme
Court in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.3
Thus, under several areas of antitrust law, the player draft should be
considered illegal as a group boycott or a concerted refusal to deal, as a
30. Comment, supra note 1, at 415.
31. It should be noted that
[blaseball's draft is somewhat less restrictive in that if the player does not wish
to play for the club which drafted him he may refuse to sign; he is then placed back
into the eligible draft pool for the next year. Id. at 416 n.62.
32. 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
33. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
[Vol. 26
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
use of monopoly power to foreclose competition, and, overall, as a clear
restraint of trade.
The eligibility rules, another aspect of the player draft, have also come
under antitrust scrutiny. The eligibility rules are basically designed to
protect the educational status of future draft choices. The rules provide
that a high school or college player may not play in professional sports until
his "eligibility" period is up. This "eligibility" period usually consists of
the time of the player's varsity sports career in high school or college. The
rationale is that the player usually finishes his educational requirements
during his "eligibility" period and before he plays in a professional sport.
Two professional leagues, however, have varied from these rules. The
World Hockey Ass'n allows high school and junior hockey hockey league
players to be drafted while the rival National Hockey League does not
allow such practice. The American Basketball Ass'n allows players to play
before their "eligibility" period is up if the player can qualify as a "hard-
ship case," i.e., as being in desperate need of the financial assistance that
a professional salary could give the player.
The eligibility rules should be deemed a group boycott. One case dealing
with professional basketball has stated that the National Basketball
Ass'n's four-year college rule constitutes a "primary" concerted refusal to
deal." The leagues have argued that Silver v. New York Stock Exchange5
authorizes group boycotts where there is a legislative mandate for self-
regulation or otherwise, thus negating the per se rule in some group boycott
situations and permitting application of the rule of reason. But the leagues
fail to realize that under Silver there is a requirement of procedural due
process if a concerted refusal to deal is to be upheld by the courts as
justifiable. 6 Thus, only where procedural due process is afforded the ag-
grieved party, can the rule of reason rather than the per se rule apply to
group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal. However, there is no oppor-
tunity for the player to present his case to any professional sports league
in order to explain his rationale for desiring to play professional before the
"eligibility" period has expired. Procedural due process has not been met
and the lack of procedural safeguards in player drafts with eligibility rules
should result in the compulsory determination that the practice is illegal
per se under the antitrust laws.
C. Blacklisting
Blacklisting has been used for harmful and beneficial purposes in profes-
sional sport. Blacklisting is the permanent banning of a player from a
league. It has been used in professional sports as a punishment for violation
of league rules and to uphold league integrity.
34. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
35. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
36. Id. at 243.
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Courts have upheld blacklisting in some circumstances. In Molinas v.
National Basketball Ass'n 7 the court held that the indefinite suspension
of a professional basketball player for gambling on the outcome of basket-
ball games in violation of contract and league rules, and the subsequent
refusal by the league to reinstate the player, thus amounting to a blacklist-
ing of the player, were not unreasonable restraints of trade within the
antitrust laws. The court stated: "A rule, and a corresponding contract
clause, providing for suspension of those who place wagers on games in
which they are participating seems not only reasonable, but necessary for
the survival of the league." 8
However, the practice has led to abuses. For example, some professional
baseball players have been blacklisted for playing in a competitive
league.3 9 In Gardella v. Chandler4 the court held that the charge of black-
listing for playing in a competitive leage was sufficient to state a cause
of action. Unfortunately the case was settled out of court and no ruling was
ever made. There have also been charges of blacklisting made by the World
Hockey Ass'n against the National Hockey League.
Blacklisting must be considered a violation of the antitrust laws. It is a
form of self-regulation or self-government which may lead to serious abuse.
Since the blacklisted player is often not granted notice or hearing, the
practice violates the procedural due process requirement of self-regulating
bodies found in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange." Blacklisting is the
use of professional sport's monopoly power to foreclose competition and
commercial activity because the teams in the league agree to ban the
player. Such activity was held unlawful in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC.42 Thus blacklisting, publicly described as necessary
and beneficial to professional sports, is in practice a harmful restraint of
trade and personal freedom.
D. Restraints Of Owners And Potential Owners
There is no question that the owners of professional sports teams are at
the root of many antitrust problems. Owners and potential owners, how-
ever, are also victims of unfair trade practices. The unfair trade practices
are found in three situations: (1) when a group or person desires to enter a
team into the league structure of a professional sport; (2) in sales of fran-
chises; and (3) upon movement of franchises.
It is very difficult for a potential owner to enter a team into a league
structure. "Generally, however, entry into professional sports leagues is
conditioned upon acceptance of the applicant by a high percentage of the
37. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
38. Id. at 243.
39. Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949); Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
40. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
41. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
42. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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existing clubs."" This practice is contrary to an important objective of the
antitrust laws-the promotion of free entry and expansion of supply as the
demand rises. The leagues argue that professional sports leagues are com-
parable to trade associations which can set rules and regulate competition
among the units in the industry. The leagues cite the peculiar nature of
their industry as the rationale for the restrictive measures they employ to
carefully regulate the entrance of new teams into the leagues. The Su-
preme Court, however, spoke to the situation of trade associations and
antitrust in Associated Press v. United States, holding "that arrangements
or combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be immunized by
adopting a membership device accomplishing that purpose."'44 Applying
that holding to professional sports, free entry into a professional sports
league should be mandatory under the law. The position of the courts,
however, has been to the contrary. In Deesen v. Professional Golfers'Ass'n
of America 5 the court held that free entry into the Professional Golfers'
Ass'n of America was not guaranteed to a professional golfer because of the
special tour structure of professional golf. The decision is astounding when
one considers other opinions dealing with the same antitrust problem in
other industries.4 6
There are also restrictions when a group or person desires to buy an
already existing sports franchise. "Restrictions on the sale of franchises are
of two types: an absolute prohibition of certain classes or owners, and a
requirement that all sales be approved by the league. ' 47 Under league
rules, the present owner selects the buyer from an approved list and then
negotiates the transaction which is then approved by the league. Buyer
selection by a manufacturer has been upheld where there is an availability
of competitive products to the party not selected, 48 but there is no availa-
bility of competitive products in professional sports. The only alternative
would be to organize a new professional league with substandard players
and build from there. This is not a very attractive or financially rewarding
alternative. Therefore, sale of franchise restrictions must be considered an
illegal restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
The third situation involves the practice of moving a franchise from one
location to another through the decision of the owner. Sometimes there are
valid reasons for the move, other times not. Nevertheless there are restric-
tions on the movement of franchises in every sport. "One league prohibits
moving teams altogether; the others require that moves be approved by an
extrodinary majority of the owners. ' 49 These rules should be classified as
43. Comment, supra note 1, at 418 n.73.
44. 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
45. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
46. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
47. Comment, supra note 9, at 428 n.50, n.51.
48. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
49. Comment, supra note 9, at 429 n.54, n.55.
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territorial restrictions or division of markets. Territorial restriction have
been held to be illegal per se.50
IV. RATIONALE OF NON-ENFORCEMENT
From the foregoing material it is evident that professional sports organi-
zations have violated the antitrust laws in numerous ways. It is also evi-
dent that the courts and Congress have generally turned their backs on
these violations. This policy of non-enforcement is unique in antitrust law.
When one surveys the history of trade regulation and professional sports
it must be concluded that there is no logical rationale for the policy of non-
enforcement.
One can understand the policy of non-enforcement in regard to baseball;
it has been held exempt from the antitrust laws through a series of ques-
tionable decisions. The policy cannot be explained, however, with respect
to football, basketball, and hockey, all of which have been held subject to
the regulation of the antitrust laws.
Even though the policy of non-enforcement can be explained for base-
ball, it is more difficult to understand why baseball was originally held
exempt from the antitrust laws and why the sport has been recently held
to be still exempt. "It is submitted that the baseball exemption is unique
because it does not fall within either the statutory or non-commerce cate-
gory of antitrust exemptions."5 Baseball was first held exempt from the
antitrust laws in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs52 in which the Court held that the
business of giving baseball exhibitions was not interstate commerce and
thus could not fall under the federal antitrust laws. It is difficult to see how
baseball could not constitute interstate commerce when exhibitions and
league games were being held in various cities across the United States.
Today it is conceded that baseball is engaged in interstate commerce, but
the same conclusion should have been reached by the Supreme Court when
the above case was decided in 1922, thus eliminating the problem at its
inception. Unfortunately the Federal Baseball decision has been upheld by
the Supreme Court in several subsequent cases. The irony is that the
Supreme Court has concluded that baseball today constitutes interstate
commerce, which was the key to the original decision. The Supreme Court
has stated other tenuous reasons for upholding the antitrust exemption of
baseball.
In 1953, baseball's exemption was again challenged in Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc.5 3 The court, after concluding that baseball constituted
50. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
51. Comment, supra note 8, at 740.
52. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
53. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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interstate commerce, nevertheless affirmed Federal Baseball on the ration-
ale that the baseball industry has flourished, secure in the knowledge that
it was exempt from antitrust legislation, and that Congress had acquiesced
by its non-action on the antitrust exemption. Basically the Supreme Court
strictly applied the doctrine of stare decisis. Baseball's exemption has been
challenged twice since the Toolson decision and in both cases the doctrine
of stare decisis was relied upon to uphold baseball's antitrust exemption.
In Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs the Court
stated:
However, putting aside instances where factual premises have all but
vanished and a different principle might thus obtain, we continue to be-
lieve that the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of over-
ruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already delivered
have created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for pron-
ouncement of the doom. 4
The most recent case, Flood v. Kuhn," has attrated a great deal of national
attention. However, the decision sounded like a copy of the earlier opinions
of the courts cited above.
Accordingly we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson and
to their application to professional baseball. . . .If there is an inconsis-
tency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing
that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court."
Thus the common threads through all of the decision involving baseball
are the doctrine of stare decisis and the role of Congress. The doctrine of
stare decisis has been misused.
A decision based on stare decisis must of course stand or fall on the
reasoning underlying the precedent decision. Where surrounding condi-
tions have so altered as to render the reasoning no longer valid, blind
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis can only lead to a state of legal
atrophy."
Congress has failed in its task of trade regulation through the enforcement
of the antitrust laws. "Over fifty bills have been introduced in Congress
concerning the relationship of baseball to the antitrust laws without Con-
gress passing any of the bills."58 The non-enforcement of the antitrust laws
with regard to baseball has been based upon the exemption of baseball
from the antitrust laws; an exemption created by the combination of the
54. 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
55. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
56. Id. at 284.
57. Comment, supra note 15, at 867.
58. Note, Antitrust Exemptions-Professional Baseball's Immunity from Antitrust Regu-
lation Upheld, 43 Miss. L.J. 718, 720 n.18 (1972).
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misuse of the doctrine of stare decisis and Congressional apathy.
There can be no rationale whatsoever for non-enforcement of the anti-
trust laws for football, basketball, and hockey as these sports were held to
be non-exempt from the antitrust laws. Despite some recent decisions in
the lower courts to the contrary, non-enforcement of the antitrust laws in
these sports is still the rule. The option clause in football and basketball
has not been held illegal while the reserve clause in hockey has been the
basis of conflicting decisions in the lower courts. 59 Congress has not helped.
In granting the American and National League merger an exemption from
the antitrust laws, it has given its stamp of approval to the unfair trade
practices of football. The total result of the non-enforcement policy by the
courts and Congress is an evasion of the objectives of antitrust law-free
enterprise and unrestrained competition and a gross disregard of the free-
dom of the individual, a result which would not be tolerated in any other
part of American industry today.
CONCLUSION
Our principal effort here has been to survey the various problems of
trade regulation and professional sports. These problems exist today and
will exist in the future unless some positive steps are taken to curb the use
of the various unfair trade practices found in professional sport. What can
be done? The main solution will be to treat professional sports exactly as
any other large industry in America is treated. Professional sports do not
need help from outside sources which condone the illegal practices. In
reality professional sports organizations are major high profit industries
and should not be treated as new and struggling industries whose survival
depends upon certain suspect rules and procedures. Professional sports
organizations are resourceful, and they will find legal alternatives to their
illegal practices if forced to do so. The courts and the Congress must realize
that they lose respect every time they condone an illegal practice which
results in unequal treatment especially where the practice is nationally
known.
Once the courts and the Congress accept professional sports as just
another industry which is violating the antitrust laws the first major hurdle
will be passed and enforcement should logically follow. The end result
would then be the fulfillment of the objectives of the antitrust laws of the
United States, that is, free enterprise and unrestrained competition in all
areas of business activity.
59. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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